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Abstract. Eugenio Regazzini was born on August 12, 1946 in Cremona
(Italy), and took his degree in 1969 at the University “L. Bocconi” of Mi-
lano. He has held positions at the universities of Torino, Bologna and Mi-
lano, and at the University “L. Bocconi” as assistant professor and lecturer
from 1974 to 1980, and then professor since 1980. He is currently professor
in probability and mathematical statistics at the University of Pavia. In the
periods 1989–2001 and 2006–2009 he was head of the Institute for Applica-
tions of Mathematics and Computer Science of the Italian National Research
Council (C.N.R.) in Milano and head of the Department of Mathematics at
the University of Pavia, respectively. For twelve years between 1989 and
2006, he served as a member of the Scientific Board of the Italian Mathe-
matical Union (U.M.I.). In 2007, he was elected Fellow of the IMS and, in
2001, Fellow of the “Istituto Lombardo—Accademia di Scienze e Lettere.”
His research activity in probability and statistics has covered a wide spec-
trum of topics, including finitely additive probabilities, foundations of the
Bayesian paradigm, exchangeability and partial exchangeability, distribution
of functionals of random probability measures, stochastic integration, history
of probability and statistics. Overall, he has been one of the most authoritative
developers of de Finetti’s legacy. In the last five years, he has extended his
scientific interests to probabilistic methods in mathematical physics; in par-
ticular, he has studied the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of equations,
which are of interest for the kinetic theory of gases. The present interview
was taken in occasion of his 65th birthday.
Key words and phrases: Bayesian inference, Dirichlet process, exchange-
ability, de Finetti, finitely additive probabilities, History of Statistics and
Probability in Italy, subjective probability.
1. PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS AT BOCCONI
UNIVERSITY
Antonio: You received your degree in economics
from “L. Bocconi” University in Milano. Why did you
decide to study economics?
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(e-mail: lijoi@unipv.it). Igor Prünster is Associate
Professor of Statistics at the Department of Applied
Mathematics and Statistics “Diego De Castro,” University
of Torino, c.so Unione Sovietica 218/bis, 10134 Torino,
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Eugenio: I enrolled in an economics degree essen-
tially because it was the only choice I had. Having at-
tended a Technical High School for Accountants, at the
time the law did not allow students from this kind of
secondary school to study mathematics at university,
which would have been my favorite option. You needed
to attend college preparatory schools to enroll in sub-
jects like mathematics. My family could not afford my
university studies and I was expected to get a job right
after completing high school. The choice I made at the
age of 14 was coherent with this scenario. By the time I
got my diploma from high school, the situation had im-
proved a little bit and I could afford going to university.
This was also due to a financial aid program, adopted
by the farseeing Italian center—left governments of the
time, for students belonging to economically disadvan-
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taged families. The money from this program (it was
around 200 euros, per year, in 1965) and the earnings
deriving from private lessons I used to teach to other
students allowed me to obtain a degree at Bocconi Uni-
versity.
Igor: Why did you choose Bocconi University and
not another university?
E: In the 1960s Bocconi was considered a presti-
gious university: a degree from it represented the key
for obtaining a good and rewarding job on the mar-
ket. These elements exerted an influence on me and
my family. However, there was also a practical rea-
son: Milano is just one hour by train from my home-
town, Cremona, and I could go back home every week-
end. Yet another reason is the influence of my friend
Lorenzo Peccati, a mathematical economist from Cre-
mona, who was a student at Bocconi while I was still at
high school. He was well aware of my bent for mathe-
matics and suggested a few advanced textbooks where
I started reading the mathematical tools used in eco-
nomic modeling. In particular, I was excited at reading
the Italian translation of the monograph Allen (1956)
on mathematical analysis for economists and this con-
vinced me that Bocconi would still have allowed me to
study Maths.
I: This is a funny coincidence since I was convinced
by Lorenzo Peccati’s son, Giovanni, by now a well-
known probabilist, to enroll at Bocconi and for pre-
cisely the same reasons. Where did your passion for
mathematics come from?
E: I was very lucky at high school because I had a
brilliant maths teacher, Sidomo Vailati. He had a vari-
ety of scientific and cultural interests and also did con-
sulting for a few private companies, thanks to his un-
usual, at least in that period, knowledge of statistics,
probability and operations research. He certainly was
a self-taught man in the area of Stochastics. At that
time, probability and statistics, unlike analysis, geom-
etry and algebra, were not perceived as relevant topics
within mathematics degrees: they were only present in
a few optional courses. To my knowledge, the only ex-
ception was the University of Roma due to the pres-
ence of Bruno de Finetti. In fact, this unfortunate situ-
ation lasted until the 1970s when the first full profes-
sors in probability, apart from de Finetti, were recruited
after national competitions. Turning back to Vailati, it
is worth recalling that, among some courses for high
school teachers organized by the Italian Ministry of
Education, he also took a course in probability, which
was delivered by de Finetti. As a consequence, at the
age of 16 I was introduced to the realm of subjectivism
and learned the first elements of probability and its ap-
plications. These first years of exposure to de Finetti’s
approach have stimulated an intellectual and scientific
interest that has certainly influenced my later research.
A: How was the environment at Bocconi University
in the years you have been there?
E: Bocconi had very few professors among its own
faculty and heavily relied upon adjunct faculty hold-
ing positions in other universities. These few profes-
sors were all influential personalities of the time, play-
ing significant roles in the Italian social, political and
economic life of the 1960s. For instance, Giovanni De-
maria was a Paretian economist who acted as economic
consultant for the constituent assembly that created the
Constitution that lies at the foundation of the modern
Italian Republic after World War II. There was also a
special feeling between Bocconi and Milano, a city that
had been able to overcome the disasters of World War
II and was experiencing dramatic economic growth
led by the manufacturing sector. Bocconi looked to
me, and many others, as a vital part of Milano and
contributed to consolidate this process. Then, during
the last couple of years, the student protests of 1968
started. Despite being a private university, Bocconi
experienced serious clashes and some of its students
played an active role in the movement.
I: Did you like studying economics?
E: I was very fond of economics. The professors
I was interacting with were quite enthusiastic about my
inclination toward developing mathematical tools use-
ful for economic modeling. There is an episode that oc-
curred during my third year that I like to recall. I was
attending a course in Political economy which included
a series of seminars and one of them concerned the
relationship between the Italian Central Bank and the
Department of Treasury, which at that time was the
subject of a lively debate. For an economic interpre-
tation of the relationship between the two institutions,
we were suggested to refer to an article by Giorgio
La Malfa and Franco Modigliani; the latter was later
awarded the Nobel prize in economics in 1985. The
main contribution of the paper was the proposal of a
static model. Playing a bit around with that model,
I was able to derive a dynamic version of it, which
seemed in line with the real situation in Italy. This was
appreciated by the other students and the teaching as-
sistants. Also in connection with the course on Public
Finance, I devised a model describing the evolution of
certain taxing decisions. Overall, I think I had quite a
good economic intuition.
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A: What did lead you to study probability and statis-
tics?
E: I was both impressed and fascinated by the first
year course in mathematics that was taught by Gio-
vanni Ricci. It was more advanced than a traditional
calculus course. The second year maths course, deliv-
ered by Giuseppe Avondo-Bodino, included also a part
devoted to probability, which actually covered essen-
tially the same material nowadays taught in first prob-
ability courses in maths degrees. During the second
year of my degree I also attended a course on statisti-
cal Inference held by Francesco Brambilla, which was
important for my education. Finally, my third maths
course by Eugenio Levi contained some probabilis-
tic applications. This experience revived my curiosity,
dating back to high school, for foundational aspects
of probability. Moreover, I perceived probability as a
tough subject and therefore more challenging and stim-
ulating than others I was studying.
I: What was the topic of your degree thesis?
E: I asked Avondo-Bodino to be my thesis supervi-
sor. He was a passionate Fisherian and hostile toward
the Bayesian paradigm: it might, thus, seem curious
that the title of my thesis was “The Bayesian approach
to hypothesis testing.” Indeed, he chose that topic
with the aim of proving the fallacy of the Bayesian
paradigm: this is revealed by the fact that the poten-
tial of the Bayesian approach was going to be assessed
with respect to hypothesis testing problems that had al-
ready received well-established answers within the fre-
quentist framework. To be honest, he did not even like
the Neyman–Pearson approach: according to him, it in-
troduced subjective elements since it relied on decision
theory. My task was essentially to: (i) collect as much
material as possible on hypothesis testing, (ii) evalu-
ate the possible impact of the Bayesian approach and
(iii) establish whether it could be a sensibile alternative
to the frequentist approach. And my supervisor obvi-
ously expected a negative answer to the last question.
A: And how did it work out? What were your first
impressions on the Bayesian approach?
E: While working on the thesis, I developed some
skepticism about the automatic implementation of
Bayes’ theorem, which was a legacy from Laplace
and his followers. However, my viewpoint was lim-
ited. In fact, writing the thesis was not an easy job,
especially because I could not rely on many system-
atic and exhaustive treatments. There were, of course,
de Finetti’s papers, but, given the unorthodox way they
were written, I was not able to understand the connec-
tion between his theory and the Anglo-American neo-
Bayesian approach typically adopted in papers appear-
ing in statistics journals at that time. De Finetti’s work
did not follow the standard Bayes–Laplace paradigm:
in contrast, he re-constructed it and recast it in a way to
be coherent with his approach to prediction. The books
I referred to were Lindley (1965), Raiffa and Schlaifer
(1968) and, mostly, Ferguson (1967), which contained
a beautiful part on the Bayesian approach from the
viewpoint of Wald’s decision theory. The 1959 lec-
ture notes of de Finetti’s course at a Summer School
in Varenna [later translated in de Finetti (1972)] and
Savage (1954) were also helpful. I obtained a few mi-
nor results in terms of interpretation and comparison
and also derived a “rule” for the choice of type-I er-
ror probability α. As soon as I completed the thesis,
the monograph DeGroot (1970) appeared: I found it
very interesting and it proved to be very useful for my
statistical education.
A: One of your best friends and main coauthors is
certainly Donato Michele Cifarelli. Did you meet him
while studying at Bocconi?
E: Yes, he is actually 10 years older than me and
was my teaching assistant while I was attending the
statistics course. He delivered insightful lectures where
it was apparent that he had remarkable mathemati-
cal skills and also a deep knowledge of the book by
E. Lehmann. Therefore, it was quite natural to seek
his help when I started working on the thesis, which
required me to study also the frequentist approaches.
His advice was very important, although at the time
he looked, at least to me, not interested into the fre-
quentist versus Bayes debate. I was impressed by his
vast knowledge of frequentist methods, both paramet-
ric and nonparametric, as well as of probability the-
ory and stochastic processes. I very much liked the fact
that he preferred fundamental, though maybe difficult,
at least for us, books to much more immediate cook-
books. For instance, he knew in great detail the cel-
ebrated monograph by J. L. Doob on stochastic pro-
cesses. We have been bound by a deep friendship and
reciprocal esteem ever since.
I: Who were other important scholars you met at the
time and who influenced your early approach to math-
ematics?
E: Overall Bocconi was an intriguing place, at least
in Italy, for probability and statistics, given these sub-
jects were, as I said, almost absent from most maths
degrees. At the time Italian statistics, and academia
in general, did not have systematic contacts with the
international community and the head of the Institute
of Statistics, Brambilla, had the merit of introducing
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and spreading the great developments in statistics and
operations research, which took place in the UK and
the US. He had contacts with foreign scholars: for ex-
ample, he is also cited by Leonard J. Savage in his
1954 book. At the heart of these scientific activities
was the Centre for Operations Research, which, among
its sponsors, could count on Adriano Olivetti, an en-
lightened and revolutionary entrepreneur of the time,
who ran the company producing the celebrated type-
writer “Lettera 22” now displayed at the Museum of
Modern Arts in New York City. His company is also
well-known for its pioneering contributions to the de-
velopment of personal computers. Among the various
cultural and scientific activities created and supported
by Adriano Olivetti, it is worth mentioning the jour-
nal “Tecnica e Organizzazione”: Brambilla was a co-
editor of the journal when de Finetti published an im-
portant paper on the essentials of computational tech-
niques based on Monte Carlo methods, “Macchine che
pensano e che fanno pensare” (“Machines that think
and that make you think”). Brambilla was a remark-
able figure: he had been the assistant of Ferruccio Parri
who, besides being one of the first Italian Prime Minis-
ters after the war, was also imprisoned by the Germans
during World War II since he had been one of the an-
tifascist opposition leaders.
A: What happened after you graduated?
E: I really enjoyed working on my thesis and I was
eager to continue, at least for some time, with research.
Ph.D. programs did not exist in Italy since they were
only introduced in the mid-1980s. So I was doomed to
the military service which was compulsory and would
have lasted for 15 months. I tried to postpone my en-
try for as long as possible, since I wanted to compete
for a scholarship from the Italian Ministry of Univer-
sity. Had I obtained it, I could have freezed it until
the end of the military service. Thankfully my strategy
was successful and, when I was discharged in January
1972, I was able to go back to university. After gradu-
ation and before starting the military service, I shared
the office at Bocconi with Cifarelli, and together we at-
tended various maths courses at the State University in
Milano. I then sat the exams during my military ser-
vice, but in the end I did not complete a maths degree,
since I was already involved in developing my own re-
search and I was willing to publish! Nonetheless, those
studies turned out to be very useful for me.
2. FROM TORINO TO BOLOGNA, MILANO
AND PAVIA
I: Unlike many Italian academics, and more in line
with what happens abroad, you have been working in
many different universities. Was this important for your
professional development?
E: Definitely. In addition to working in various uni-
versities, I also experienced very different environ-
ments. It has been very helpful from both a scientific
and personal point of view. I met many statisticians
and mathematicians with very different backgrounds.
My first experience outside Bocconi was in Torino: it
was a small Department, most colleagues were of my
age and so it was pretty easy to settle in. Afterward I
moved to Bologna in a much larger Department more
in line with the Italian statistics tradition. Then I got
back to Milano: first at the Mathematics Department
of the State University and, then, to Bocconi. Finally
Pavia, which is one of the oldest universities founded
in 1361 and in a very prestigious Mathematics Depart-
ment of which I am a proud member.
A: Tell us a bit about your first steps in the Italian
academia in Torino.
E: My supervisor, Avondo-Bodino, was full profes-
sor in Torino and a lecturer at his department resigned
and decided to leave the academia. Since they needed a
replacement, in December 1973 I moved there with the
concrete opportunity of obtaining, later, a permanent
position. Due to absurd bureaucratic reasons, I finally
obtained an Assistant Professorship only in 1978.
I: You obtained a full professorship position in a na-
tional competition at a young age in 1980 and, there-
fore, moved to Bologna which hosted one of the few
faculties of statistics in Italy. Then back to Milano.
E: That was a time Italy was investing in univer-
sities, unlike now. Therefore, the career perspectives
were quite good also in the academia if you worked
hard. Incidentally, the head of the selection committee
was de Finetti, I must say a recurrent figure in my life.
In 1980 the only autonomous statistics faculties were
Roma and Padova, whereas Bologna and Palermo were
offering statistics degrees but within economics facul-
ties. Statistics became a faculty in Bologna only toward
the end of the 1980s. In fact, and in contrast to what
happens outside Italy, faculties are pivotal players in
Italian academia, mainly because they manage the re-
cruitment. Now it seems that things will change but,
as we say in Italy, everything changes so that nothing
changes. Anyhow, in Bologna I mostly taught proba-
bility courses, but my ties to Milano were still strong,
especially because of my collaboration with Cifarelli.
Therefore, I accepted the offer from the Mathematics
Department of the University of Milano in 1984, where
they did not have a faculty member doing research in
probability and mathematical statistics until my arrival.
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A key role for my transfer was played by an analyst,
Marco Cugiani, whom I also replaced as director of a
research institute of the C.N.R., nowadays the Milano
branch of the Institute of Applied Mathematics and In-
formation Technology.
A: In 1989 you moved back to your beloved Bocconi
University. Did you find any substantial changes since
the last time you had been there?
E: At Bocconi things had changed a lot, the most ap-
parent being that it had turned from an elite to a larger
and more open university with something like 10,000
students. Hence, I think that some changes were nec-
essary. As for myself, I was in a somehow privileged
position since I was mostly teaching advanced and not
compulsory courses, which were much more challeng-
ing than most other courses. Therefore, starting from a
yearly basin of more than 2,000 students of very good
quality, by self-selection I had small numbers of stu-
dents, who were highly motivated and of the highest
quality. I guess I have to mention you two, will not I?
But let me also mention Chiara Sabatti and Giovanni
Peccati, among many others.
I: What convinced you to move to another university
in 1998?
E: During the 1990s, while I was there, an even more
radical reorganization was occurring: courses of the
type I was teaching were perceived as too “aristocratic”
and had too few students so that they were doomed to
be shut down. And the same destiny was foreseen for
the most challenging degrees. In fact, when I moved
back in 1989, I did it with the aim of setting up a statis-
tics degree: I was very disappointed when the project
was officially turned down in 1997. Therefore, I de-
cided that my experience at Bocconi was concluded
and that I wanted to move back to a maths depart-
ment. Nonetheless, I still have a special affective re-
lation with Bocconi.
I: Then you moved to Pavia. And I followed you,
given I had just graduated from Bocconi and started
my Ph.D. in Pavia. It was a new challenge for you at a
mature age, was it not?
E: The only science faculty members and future col-
leagues of mine in Pavia I knew in person, prior to
moving, were three brilliant mathematicians: Maur-
izio Cornalba (we were both members of the scien-
tific committee of the Italian Mathematical Union),
Franco Brezzi (we got to know each other at the meet-
ings of the Italian National Research Council) and En-
rico Magenes. Enrico Magenes, who passed away last
November, shaped the department in its current form
and significantly contributed to its international stand-
ing. When I moved, I was one of only two probabilists
and since then we have been able to hire two additional
Assistant Professors. Once arrived, with great enthusi-
asm I immediately got involved in the Ph.D. program
and the outcome has been rewarding, as also witnessed
by the achievements of some former Ph.D. students.
A: Throughout your career you have been working at
faculties of science and economics, at public and pri-
vate universities. What environment do you think better
fits the needs of a researcher in probability and statisti-
cal science?
E: I think that the ideal environment, relatively to the
Italian experience which is the only one I am aware of,
is a maths department which is open toward the mod-
ern trends and research directions of mathematics and
therefore not too much bound to traditional subjects
like analysis, geometry and mathematical physics. And
thankfully there are various departments that comply
with these criteria. However, I must admit I am a bit
pessimistic about the future: the Italian university sys-
tem in general, and departments involved in basic re-
search in particular, are struggling and suffering due to
the indiscriminate financial cuts in recent years. These
have been implemented somehow light-heartedly by
the government since cuts in basic research funding are
unlikely, at least in Italy, to cause immediate social up-
heaval. In fact, it would be important to abandon the
habit of uniformly distributed cuts and aim at creating,
or consolidating, niches of excellence. And I have seen
many such niches during my career.
3. BAYESIAN INFERENCE
I: At the beginning of your academic career you
started working on inferential problems according to
the frequentist approach.
E: My interest in frequentist inference started soon
after completing my degree thesis and heavily bene-
fited from the collaboration with Cifarelli. And one of
the first topics we started working on was hypothesis
testing. Corrado Gini and other Italian statisticians had
introduced a considerable number of summary statis-
tics that were originally used only for exploratory data
analysis to measure, for instance, concentration, vari-
ability, dependence and similarity between sets of data,
and so on. Our idea was to use such summary mea-
sures for inferential purposes and, specifically, as test
statistics for studying dependence in nonparametric
problems. An early contribution in this direction was
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achieved by Cifarelli (1975) who studied the asymp-
totic distribution of a statistic arising in a test of homo-
geneity for two-sample problems. The paper contained
a remarkable result on the distribution of the integral of
the absolute value of the Brownian bridge. Our initial
efforts led to a paper (Cifarelli and Regazzini, 1974)
that we are very proud of: there we determine the limit-
ing distribution of a measure of monotone dependence
introduced by Gini. The program we set was very ap-
pealing and consisted in checking whether these statis-
tics, when used for hypothesis testing, yielded tests that
were more efficient than those commonly used at the
time. For example, the index of monotone dependence
I was mentioning was compared with Spearman’s ρ
and with Kendall’s τ and in some cases it featured bet-
ter performances.
A: Around the mid-1970s you turned back to Baye-
sianism. What about your skepticism?
E: Yes, and my experience at University of Torino
was fundamental in this respect. The department li-
brary held the collection of all de Finetti’s papers, well
kept and easily accessible. I started looking at contri-
butions cited by Savage as decisive for the foundations
of the Bayesian paradigm. My curiosity was fueled
by the fact that, as I said, de Finetti’s work appeared
to me completely disconnected from the Bayesianism
I had studied on books and journal articles. It was a
challenging task since de Finetti’s writing style, which
was actually one of the main aspects he was criti-
cized for, was unorthodox and sometimes seemingly
cryptic. Nonetheless, hard work and stubbornness fi-
nally allowed me to understand why de Finetti intro-
duced exchangeability and the role such a form of
symmetry plays in the reconstruction he gave of the
Bayes–Laplace paradigm. This really opened my eyes
on a new world providing a coherent and unified view
of statistical inference, where subjective probabilities
play an important role. In fact, suddenly the subjective
interpretation of probability was the only one that made
sense to me from both a philosophical and a mathemat-
ical point of view.
I: You were then able to convince Cifarelli to enter
the realm of Bayesian statistics.
E: I have to say that Cifarelli shared my same doubts
on the foundations of the Bayesian approach to statisti-
cal inference. However, after completing my study pro-
gram in Torino I pointed him to the references where
de Finetti was answering our questions and solving
our doubts. Besides de Finetti’s well-known papers,
I had discovered many other “minor” contributions that
were important for understanding the unified frame-
work he had in mind. And, after struggling to under-
stand, I started to love his style: entering his world had
been very demanding, but once I succeeded the reward
was incomparable. In his work one could find ideas,
hints and concepts whose expressive force was much
more powerful than a standard presentation of defini-
tions, theorems and cool mathematical technicalities.
Spurred by the enthusiasm, I had been able to convince
Cifarelli and we started working together in this direc-
tion.
I: Is this when you started your research on Bayesian
nonparametrics?
E: In some sense, yes. On the one hand, we were
hoping to be able to tackle in a Bayesian setting the
same issues we had addressed within classical non-
parametric inference. On the other hand, we guessed
that our starting point should have been de Finetti’s
representation theorem as stated in de Finetti (1937a)
which we could consider as being nonparametric. In
this fundamental paper, the law of an exchangeable se-
quence is described as a mixture on a space of probabil-
ity measures and the prior is the almost sure limit, in a
weak sense, of the empirical measure generated by the
data. This motivated the investigation of random prob-
ability measures (rpm’s) for statistical inference and
might have led to extend the Bayes–Laplace paradigm.
We planned to consider estimation of functionals of
rpm’s such as the mean, the variance or other character-
istic parameters of the unknown distribution. The nec-
essary preliminary step was to determine the posterior
distribution of these functionals. A helpful reference
was a short paper (de Finetti, 1935), where de Finetti
provides a reformulation in Bayesian terms of meth-
ods used in exploratory data analysis for smoothing the
empirical distribution. Moving from this, he basically
addressed in a nonparametric framework both the issue
of prediction and of evaluation of the posterior distri-
bution on a set of probability measures. Unfortunately,
we had no clue on how to define a probability distri-
bution on a space of probability measures that would
be analytically tractable. Of course, we were not aware
of T. S. Ferguson’s paper (Ferguson, 1973). We were
stuck and all the attempts we made led us nowhere.
A: Was there any decisive event that helped you
overcoming these difficulties?
E: In 1976 I met Andrew L. Rukhin who had left
the Soviet Union and was in Italy just before migrating
to the US. We discussed our research activities and I
described to him the technical problems Cifarelli and I
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were dealing with. He suggested we go through Fergu-
son’s paper in order to find an answer to our questions.
And, indeed, that was the case: that paper allowed us
to resume our project. So we started considering lin-
ear functionals of the Dirichlet process with the aim of
determining their probability distributions analytically.
A and I: Let us also recall that the study of the
Dirichlet process suited your passion for classical mu-
sic very well!
E: Gustav Dirichlet is associated with the distri-
bution because he evaluated the integral on the sim-
plex. The musical connection is that he married Re-
becka Henriette Mendelssohn, younger sister of Felix
Mendelssohn, the famous German composer.
I: Were there other Bayesians in Italy at the time?
E: A few years after its re-flourishing at an interna-
tional level, due to the work of Leonard J. Savage, the
Bayesian approach was sort of rediscovered in Italy
as well. This may sound surprising given de Finetti
is Italian: however, one has to consider that de Finetti
only entered academia in 1946, at the age of 40, when
his research was already focused on different topics.
Interestingly, he had obtained the position already in
1939, but could only start his job in 1946 after the fall
of the fascist regime due to a law forbidding the ap-
pointment of unmarried professors, as was de Finetti’s
case. Anyhow, in those years there was a large group
led by Giuseppe Pompilj in Roma and some scholars
started to work on Bayesian statistics, like Ludovico
Piccinato. In Roma there were also some of de Finetti’s
students like, for instance, Fabio Spizzichino. I should
also mention a group based in Trieste and coordinated
by Luciano Daboni, who started working under de
Finetti’s supervision soon after gaining his university
degree. Besides actuarial mathematics, they focused
mainly on exchangeable processes and foundational is-
sues of Bayesian inference and, during the years, I had
many fruitful interactions with them.
A: Even if more interested in the Bayesian paradigm,
you did not avoid doing research based on a frequen-
tist approach. It seems you did not, and still do not,
see any ideological contraposition between Bayesian-
ism and frequentism.
E: I have never seen this as an ideological contra-
position. I think that ideological positions make sense
only outside the realm of mathematics. Anyhow, even
when I was working on statistical problems accord-
ing to the frequentist approach, I always had the feel-
ing that the Bayesian framework was far more com-
plete and logically sound. I was not enthusiastic about
the automatic use of priors on unobservable parame-
ters: the subjective views I had on probability were in
conflict with such a treatment of the Bayes–Laplace
paradigm, as I believe that inference must concern
quantities that can be empirically observed. But, on
the other hand, the Fisherian attitude appeared to me
as too drastic, because prior beliefs should play a role
in statistical inference. Once able to fully understand
the consequences of de Finetti’s results, I became con-
vinced that Bayesianism was the only acceptable way
of inductive reasoning.
A: Current developments in Bayesian inference in-
volve a heavy use of simulation algorithms. Do you
still think there is a need for putting a strong effort in
determining exact forms of Bayesian inferences (or, at
least, error evaluation when approximations are used),
even when these are difficult to use in practice?
E: Computational techniques have been decisive in
making Bayesian models applicable to real world prob-
lems and some recent applications I saw are simply
amazing. I definitely think that the advantages they
yield largely surpass some drawbacks associated with
their uses. That said, I would still like to make a point,
which I think is important since it has to do with
how statistical modeling is conceived. Indeed, mod-
els should be devised as simple as possible, while still
preserving the capability of capturing the essential fea-
tures of the phenomenon under study. Such a simplifi-
cation could be achieved by first detecting inessential
elements and, then, dropping them when it comes to
the point of specifying the model. This attitude is nat-
ural when one aims at achieving exact estimates of the
quantities of interest. However, if the need for pushing
analytic results as far as possible disappears, it is likely
that the models become more loose and unnecessarily
complex. Both parsimony and extreme care in the for-
malization of models are still important guidelines for
research: the only difference is that they now need to be
spelled out clearly, while they were implicitly followed
in the past. Another related and important point con-
cerns approximation. When exact inferences are not
possible, one should put some effort in providing an
upper bound to the error of approximation yielded by
the numerical techniques that are used. I have tried my-
self to work in this direction, for instance, in relation to
approximating the probability distribution of the mean
of a Dirichlet process. I know this is a challenging task,
but it cannot be avoided.
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4. DE FINETTI AND THE INFLUENCE OF
DE FINETTI’S WORK
I: There is no doubt your research has been deeply
influenced by de Finetti’s work. Which was the first
paper of de Finetti you read through?
E: While I was completing my thesis at Bocconi I
came across his joint paper with Savage (de Finetti
and Savage, 1962). It contained a discussion on the
choice of the prior distribution and was mainly illustra-
tive with no deep mathematics involved but still evoca-
tive for a novice.
A: His most renowned piece of work certainly is
the two-volume book on probability theory, de Finetti
(1970). What else would you suggest to a student who
is willing to study and understand de Finetti’s stance in
probability and statistics?
E: I would certainly suggest de Finetti (2006), two
volumes containing selected papers by de Finetti,
which have been published by the Italian Mathemat-
ical Union in 2006 in occasion of the centenary of
his birth. The first volume is on probability and statis-
tics, whereas the second is on applied maths and on
the teaching of maths. As for his subjective views on
probability, one should refer to de Finetti (1931). One
should also read de Finetti (1937a). Another important
piece of work is de Finetti (1972). Finally, de Finetti
(1992) contains a selection of some of de Finetti’s pa-
pers with English translation. Unfortunately, some sig-
nificant contributions, at least to my knowledge, have
been only published in Italian, such as those related to
independent increments processes and some others on
the subjectivistic definition and interpretation of prob-
ability.
I: As you just mentioned, the fact that he was not
writing in English hindered the circulation of his ideas
and results in the scientific community.
E: This is definitely true. For example, it is probably
unknown to many that de Finetti introduced the cele-
brated τ index a few years before Kendall (de Finetti,
1937b). In 1939 he obtained some important results on
optional stopping: indeed, de Finetti (1939) deals with
the gambler’s ruin problem, where one can also find an
embryonic version of the Girsanov theorem. Another
important contribution was the continuity theorem for
characteristic functions: he proved it in the appendix
of de Finetti (1930a). Besides these, it is worth list-
ing a few other contributions for which a priority to
de Finetti should be acknowledged: he completed what
is now known as the Glivenko–Cantelli theorem before
Francesco P. Cantelli in de Finetti (1933); in de Finetti
(1940) he devised a model that anticipated the portfo-
lio theory for which Markowitz was awarded the No-
bel prize; he proved the theorem on almost everywhere
nondifferentiability of the trajectories of the Brownian
motion in de Finetti (1929).
A: With reference to the de Finetti (1929) paper,
which is actually our favorite, should we not as Ital-
ians propose Lévy processes be called de Finetti–Lévy
processes instead?
E: As I mentioned before, the answer is affirmative.
Indeed, de Finetti started from a more general prob-
lem of providing the random counterparts of a Volterra
classification for the ordinary laws of physics. In this
context he identified processes with independent and
homogeneous increments as those whose characteristic
function satisfies the first of the equations in Volterra’s
classification, namely, X′ = f (λ). As a by-product, he
also introduced implicitly the notion of infinite divisi-
bility. In a subsequent paper, de Finetti (1930b), he fur-
ther characterized the class of infinitely divisible laws
as the class of distribution limits of compound Pois-
son processes, thus providing a representation theo-
rem for infinitely divisible distributions. Lévy was not
aware of de Finetti (1929) and resorted to a different
approach to obtain more general and deep results. The
contribution by Khintchine to the well-known Lévy–
Khintchine representation originates from a paper pub-
lished in 1937 (see Khintchine, 1937): Khintchine’s
paper builds upon Kolmogorov (1932), where Kol-
mogorov explicitly mentioned (even in the title of the
article) that he was resorting to the approach set forth
by de Finetti. So, yes, it should definitely be de Finetti–
Lévy processes.
I: And what were his connections with the broader
international scientific community?
E: His first international contacts, before graduating
in mathematics at the University of Milano, are related
to a paper, de Finetti (1926), he wrote on Mendelian
inheritance, which had quite an impact in biology. It
was his first paper and appeared on the Italian jour-
nal Metron. His results also attracted the attention of
Alfred J. Lotka and Jacques S. Hadamard. The latter
was so impressed by de Finetti’s achievements that he
suggested Georges Darmois to study the paper, as wit-
nessed by one of the letters that de Finetti wrote to his
mother in 1929 and that have recently been published
by his daughter Fulvia. This research also originated
the so-called de Finetti diagrams that are extensively
used in population genetics.
A: An important event at which de Finetti drew at-
tention on his research in probability was the Interna-
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tional Congress of Mathematicians (ICM), which was
held in Bologna in 1928.
E: That conference was definitely important for the
development of de Finetti’s interactions with foreign
scholars. On that occasion he presented his first re-
sults on exchangeability and made contact with Mau-
rice R. Fréchet, who later invited him to the Institut
Henri Poincaré in 1935 and to the Colloque de Génève
in 1937 where he then also met Jerzy Neyman and oth-
ers. He had frequent interactions with Paul Lévy and
Aleksandr Khintchine, respectively, on independent in-
crement processes and on the proof of the representa-
tion theorem for exchangeable sequences. He was also
in contact with Andrey N. Kolmogorov, as witnessed
by the Kolmogorov (1932) paper on infinite divisibility
whose title contains an explicit reference to “A problem
of de Finetti.” Both Kolmogorov and de Finetti also
worked at the same time on the derivation of a repre-
sentation theorem for associative means, now known
as the de Finetti–Kolmogorov–Nagumo Theorem. He
also got in contact with many eminent mathematicians
via mail. In fact, he used to have a notebook in which
he recorded to whom he had sent which of his papers:
de Finetti’s daughter, Fulvia, once showed it to me
and the names are impressive. After World War II he
had significant scientific collaborations with Leonard J.
Savage and Lester Dubins and he interacted also with
William Feller and Abraham Wald.
I: Were his views on the subjective approach to prob-
ability theory held in high regard?
E: In mathematics his work has been largely ignored,
and not only because of the subjective interpretation.
Indeed, the mathematical approach yielded by such
interpretation does not require σ -additivity. In fact,
finitely additive laws also become admissible and the
traditional measure–theoretic approach to probability
theory represents obviously a particular case. Count-
ably additive probabilities are coherent in de Finetti’s
sense but are just a subclass of coherent laws. And
de Finetti himself was well aware that many results
could have been neater by assuming countable additiv-
ity. We may reasonably conjecture that his position in
favor of including finitely additive probabilities some-
how put him off from focusing on the particular count-
ably additive setup. This could explain, for example,
why he did not further investigate processes with in-
dependent increments. It is to be noted that the frame-
work for his subjective approach had been settled by
1931 and, as evident from his published mail exchange
with M. Fréchet, he fought for it for a while.
I: And what about the impact on statistical practice?
E: In Bayesian statistics references to subjectivism
are quite frequent, but I actually see little of de Finetti
behind them. First, in the subjective approach also
finitely additive laws are allowed and, therefore, a proper
subjectivist should try to analyze statistical problems
in this setup. This point is very important in the
case where “transcendent” conditions—such as con-
vergence of sequences of random elements, forms
of the corresponding limits, etc.—are involved: one
should, then, establish the extent to which the conclu-
sions depend on the specific σ -additive extension (usu-
ally unique) of the original finite-dimensional distri-
butions. Second, from an interpretation point of view,
subjectivism and objectivism are often mixed up and
Bayes theorem is applied in an automatic way, whereas
subjectivism would require probabilistic statements to
be made on verifiable events. Subjectivism seems more
a kind of catch-phrase than a real commitment. In my
opinion, the papers of L. J. Savage, L. Dubins, J. Pit-
man, P. Diaconis and D. Freedman are the ones that
adhere most closely to de Finetti’s views.
A: Did your convinced support of subjective proba-
bility affect the way you teach probability courses?
E: This represented a sort of dilemma throughout
my career. Focusing solely on de Finetti’s mathemat-
ical theory of probability would have implied provid-
ing students with an unorthodox background in prob-
ability: it could have been an enrichment for some
of them but also a drawback for some others, espe-
cially for those who needed to use probability as a
mere tool in other disciplines. Therefore, most of the
courses I taught were within the σ -additivity frame-
work. Nonetheless, I have always tried to illustrate ex-
tensively some distinctive features of the subjective
viewpoint in one of my first lectures. This was useful
since it provided students with a more complete pic-
ture of the subject and allowed them to understand that
the results I was going to state and prove were valid
on a special class of probabilities sharing the property
of countable additivity. Students were, then, aware that
it was somehow like teaching them a course in analy-
sis that was just about analytic functions! The connec-
tion with conditional properties was far more difficult
to point out. As for the subjective interpretation, it is
still possible to preserve it even when confining to σ -
additive probabilities.
A: Can you provide some further insight on this last
issue?
E: The difficulty I am referring to arises due to the
fact that Kolmogorov’s definition cannot be seen as a
special case of coherent conditional probabilities. In
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fact, the Kolmogorov approach lacks an appropriate
axiomatization and interpretation of conditional prob-
ability: the definition is by means of a limiting pro-
cedure. The perspective is then completely different.
For example, de Finetti’s approach necessarily leads to
conditional probabilities that are regular and proper,
whereas it is well known that Kolmogorov’s defini-
tion does not. In order to grasp these mathematical and
conceptual differences on conditional expectations and
probabilities, one can refer to the works by L. Dubins,
David Blackwell, Czeslaw Ryll-Nardzewski, William
D. Sudderth, Roger A. Purves, Pietro Rigo, Patrizia
Berti and also myself.
I: Tell us about your meetings with de Finetti.
E: I first met him in 1969 at a summer course on
mathematical economics in Urbino. Since I was work-
ing on my thesis, I took the opportunity to ask him a
few questions about his paper with Savage (de Finetti
and Savage, 1962) I had read. He was not very talkative
and probably thought I was not understanding any-
thing. He was right, but I still went away with the im-
pression that it was not simple at all to interact with
him. Afterward I met him at some conferences during
the 1970s, but at that time he was not working on statis-
tics and probability with the same intensity and creativ-
ity of the early days: he was more inclined to elaborate
on general philosophical and foundational aspects. The
only thing I can say about our meetings is that I had
the impression he was interested in nontrivial and orig-
inal approaches or attitudes that to some other people
might have appeared as singularities. For example, in
Bologna he once told me he had been fascinated by
the mathematical physics lectures held at the Polytech-
nic in Milano by a lecturer, Bruno Finzi, whose assign-
ments were notoriously challenging and contained ex-
ercises that Finzi himself could not solve. He recalled
the solutions he had been able to give were very orig-
inal and much appreciated by Finzi. He also told me
he had appreciated lectures on economics of insurance
companies delivered by Ulisse Gobbi at the Polytech-
nic in Milano because they had been the source of in-
spiration for the mathematical modeling of many as-
pects of economics he had later investigated. I am sur-
prised by this, since in Gobbi’s work I did not find any
mathematical formalism.
A: He was also engaged in public life and gained
some popularity because of his political experience.
E: His political experiences can be well understood
if one refers to the environment where he grew up.
De Finetti’s family was wealthy and highly educated.
They were part of the Italian community in territories
of the Habsburg Empire, and his father was an engineer
working for the Austro-Hungarian railway. During his
childhood he had learned about the irredentist ideas
of the Italian minority that was aiming at unification
with Italy. Such aspirations quite naturally developed
into strong nationalist feelings once the area became
part of Italy. Moreover, having been part of a minor-
ity, he developed a strong sensitivity toward injustice
in all respects and, therefore, also a strong criticism
toward some social implications of capitalism of the
time. This blend of ideas somehow naturally led him
to support the rising fascist party: its initial political
and social program included a series of reforms whose
goal was the complete State control of the economy.
As de Finetti himself wrote a few years before dying,
the direction of the whole economy, once freed from
the terrible tangle of individual and interest group self-
ishness, should lean toward the collective achievement
of a Paretian “optimum” and should be further inspired
by “fairness” criteria.
A: Hence, his support to fascism was mainly the re-
sult of ideal feelings that were fueled by strong social
and economic views.
E: This is further witnessed by the fact that after the
fall of fascism, he sympathized with left-wing move-
ments without adhering to a large political party. Fi-
nally, during the 1970s he started being involved in im-
portant campaigns for civil rights and for social justice.
The Italian party that better fitted his political thoughts
of the time was the Radical party.
I: Can you tell us something about it? It seems that,
while being involved in political activities set forth by
the Radical Party, he spent one night in jail!
E: In fact, he did not end up in jail because the or-
der to release him arrived before being imprisoned. To
make a long story short, he was editor of a newspa-
per of the Radical Party, which was publishing letters
of conscientious objectors who refused to perform the
compulsory military service. This was illegal at the
time. The day he learned he was going to be arrested,
he asked the police whether it was possible to arrest
him at the Accademia dei Lincei, the most prestigious
Italian science academy, where he was going to have
an official meeting the day after. He motivated such
a seemingly bizarre request with the fact that the po-
lice could have saved some money by not picking him
up by car at home: the Accademia dei Lincei building
was, indeed, just a few steps away from the prison he
was supposed to go to. However, the order to release
him arrived as soon as he got to jail. This episode had
a huge echo in the press.
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A: We also recall a story you told us about Kol-
mogorov visiting Roma and wanting to meet de Finetti.
E: In 1962 Kolmogorov was awarded the Balzan
prize for Mathematics, the other awardees being Pope
Giovanni XXIII for Peace, Paul Hindemith for Arts,
Samuel E. Morison for Humanities and Karl von Frisch
for Biology. Two well-known mathematicians, Gae-
tano Fichera and Olga A. Oleinik, went to collect him
at the Roma airport and asked him what they could
do for him. And, as Fichera reported, his answer was,
“If you know him, then you should organize a meeting
with de Finetti.”
A and I: De Finetti’s papers are scattered with bril-
liant ideas, sometimes only sketched. What are the as-
pects of de Finetti’s work which still need to be devel-
oped?
E: As for some specific topics, such as exchange-
ability and processes with independent increments, in
my opinion most of his ideas have already been exten-
sively developed and not much is left to investigate in
the precise direction he had originally thought of. On
the other hand, I believe that much is still left to inves-
tigate on the general foundations of probability theory
that emerge from his work and that he strongly sup-
ported. These studies might have a relevant impact in
statistics, in physics and in other research areas. The
advances I am thinking of concern both the interpre-
tation of probability and the enlargement—along with
its mathematical implications—of the class of admissi-
ble probability laws to include also the finitely additive
ones.
5. PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS IN ITALY
A: You investigated quite extensively the develop-
ment of statistics and probability in Italy in the first
half of the 20th century (e.g., Regazzini, 2005). Can
you tell us about it?
E: In contrast to what happened in the Anglo–
American world or in Russia, in Italy probability and
statistics developed along almost separate paths. Prob-
ability started growing in mathematical environments.
As far as I know, the first to deal with the topic in
a comprehensive way was Guido Castelnuovo, a fa-
mous mathematician who was mainly doing research
in algebra and geometry. His 1919 book on probability
(Castelnuovo, 1919) was used as a textbook for quite
some time in those few mathematics degrees where
probability was taught. The interpretation of proba-
bility was frequentist, in line with a view that would
have been later shared also by Fréchet, Lévy and Kol-
mogorov, and covered results of the Russian school up
to Andrey Markov and Aleksandr M. Lyapunov. Al-
ready, back in 1915 he had the idea of setting up a
school of statistics and actuarial sciences at the Univer-
sity of Roma, which was then created in 1927. It had
considerable success with many enrolled foreign stu-
dents and then became a proper faculty in 1936 with
Gini. In the preparation of his book Castelnuovo was
helped by Cantelli, who is considered, also at an in-
ternational level, one of the first modern probabilists.
He derived, among other contributions, versions of
the laws of large numbers, the Borel–Cantelli lemma,
a mathematical theory of risk that was named after
him, and developed an autonomous abstract measure–
theoretic theory of probability, which appeared before
Kolmogorov’s. It is interesting to recall that in this last
development a crucial point was the proof of the exis-
tence of measurable maps defined on [0,1], endowed
with the uniform distribution, in such a way they have
prescribed probability laws: such an approach also re-
flects the idea of adhering to the classical definition
of probability due to Laplace. Anyhow, this problem
led him and his students to anticipate at least part of
what is nowadays known as the Skorokhod representa-
tion. A distinguished scholar who obtained important
results along the lines of research undertaken by Can-
telli was Giuseppe Ottaviani, who is also known for
his inequalities that are related to Cantelli’s theory of
risk. Francesco G. Tricomi, eminent analyst and friend
of Cantelli, also gave some contributions to probability
as did Carlo E. Bonferroni, who is well known for his
inequalities.
A: Given such a glorious tradition, it is quite surpris-
ing, as you said earlier, that the first full professors in
probability were appointed by Italian universities only
in the 1970s, with the notable exception of de Finetti.
E: Actually, at the beginning of the 1970s only two
professors in probability were recruited, namely, Gior-
gio Dall’Aglio and Giorgio Letta. Dall’Aglio was at the
Faculty of Statistics in Rome and was a member of the
before mentioned group led by Pompilj. Letta is from
Pisa and spent several research periods in Germany
and France. The latter experience stimulated collabo-
rations between Italian probabilists—some of whom
were Letta’s students—and French probabilists in Paris
and Strasbourg, a fruitful trend which is still ongoing.
Then a larger group of people were appointed at the
end of the 1970s in various Italian universities.
I: And what about statistics?
E: In the last three decades of the 19th century,
topics that are today ascribed to Mathematical Statis-
tics were taught in geodesy or astronomy courses.
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Lectures by a not well-known Italian mathematician,
Paolo Pizzetti, were very interesting and contained
some innovative ideas on significance tests. More con-
ventional, at least according to the Italian framework,
statistics courses were in law faculties: many academic
statisticians actually had a degree in law. Most of them
were involved in Official statistics and it was therefore
natural that the interactions between statisticians and
probabilists were rather limited. The first modern Ital-
ian statistician was Rodolfo Benini, who had a law de-
gree from the University of Pavia and developed statis-
tical methods for demographic, sociological and eco-
nomic problems around the end of the 19th and the be-
ginning of the 20th century. I recall once I came across
historical documents presented in noteworthy confer-
ences of the American and British Economic Societies
where Benini is referred to as one of the founders of
econometrics. I think this due to his analysis of in-
come and wealth distributions and to the pioneering
use of multiple regression methods to estimate, for ex-
ample, demand curves. He also had the idea of study-
ing contingency tables with fixed marginals. Among
his successors, the main figure is certainly Gini, also
a graduate in law. His methodological contributions to
statistics were praiseworthy and were later studied not
only in relation to mere data analysis. Gini dominated
Italian statistics until his death in 1965 and created
a school of faithful followers. A prominent group of
scholars was led by Pompilj at the Faculty of Statistics
in Roma. As I recalled earlier, Dall’Aglio was one of
its members and he obtained noteworthy mathematical
results that can be traced back to the Ginian analysis
of statistical relationships. His results, however, have a
remarkable independent interest: for example, he pro-
vided a relevant contribution to the definition and to the
properties of what is today known as the Wasserstein
distance. See Dall’Aglio (1956).
A: You mentioned Paolo Pizzetti who seems to be a
neglected figure within the Italian statistics community,
was he not? We have never heard of him in our statistics
courses.
E: Yes, he was unfairly neglected. His contributions,
which appeared in the 1880’s, were very innovative
and relied on an original approach that somehow an-
ticipated a few distinguishing ideas lying at the foun-
dations of statistics as set forth by Karl Pearson and
by Ronald A. Fisher. As an example, he proposed pro-
cedures that were very similar to the significance tests
Fisher would have later adopted as a distinctive fea-
ture of his methods. Pizzetti also had remarkable math-
ematical skills that allowed him to determine the ex-
act distribution of certain statistics used for data anal-
ysis. And he was well aware of the results achieved,
in this direction, by a German geodesist Friedrich R.
Helmert. He reproved Helmert’s results with the aim
of extending them and relied on innovative methods
and techniques that Fisher himself would have later
proposed independently. This is very well documented
in a recent historical monograph by Anders Hald. As
you can easily guess, Pizzetti’s ideas were totally dif-
ferent from those that Gini would have later expressed
apropos of the Fisherian tests. Indeed, Gini was very
critical about the use of significance tests and his crit-
icisms were shared by de Finetti. This may partly ex-
plain why Pizzetti is not known by many statisticians.
His work was somehow considered as heterodox for
quite some time, as demonstrated by the 1960s reprint
of Pizzetti’s 1892 book (Pizzetti, 1963). In the preface,
written by V. Castellano, P. Fortunati and G. Pompilj, it
is claimed that parts of Pizzetti’s work were “mislead-
ing and. . . contained errors that had been masterfully
pointed out by Gini in Gini (1939).” And the “mis-
leading parts” they were referring to are exactly those
where Pizzetti uses his results for devising statistical
tests.
A and I: The excerpt you read can partly explain
the isolation of the Italian statistics community in those
years.
E: It partially does. Indeed, I think that Gini’s crit-
ical remarks make sense. The point is that they were
not complemented by alternative proposals that could
take his concerns into account. Hence, it was almost
inevitable that Gini’s position would have become
marginal and isolated within the broader international
community. It should be recalled that isolation fitted
very well with the political climate favoring autarkic
tendencies during the fascist regime and it unfortu-
nately further consolidated over the years in the Italian
statistics community, at least in academia. This obvi-
ously had a long-lasting negative impact, from which
Italian statistics started recovering only in the 1970s.
A: Gini was appreciated both for his scientific
achievements and for his praiseworthy services as a
scientific expert within various important Italian insti-
tutions.
E: Definitely. He was founding President of the Ital-
ian Central Institute of Statistics in 1926 and set up
first the School and then the faculty of statistics, de-
mographic and actuarial sciences in Roma in 1936. He
was in constant contact, also meeting him in person,
with Mussolini, who used to pay attention to statisti-
cal analyses for taking decisions on policy issues. For
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example, he acted as a technical advisor within the
programs of demographic and eugenics policies pur-
sued by the fascist regime. Later he also founded the
Italian Statistical Society, of which he has been Pres-
ident for 20 years. Besides the scientific and institu-
tional authoritativeness he gained in Italy, it should be
recalled that he obtained countless recognitions abroad
as well. Among them I could mention that he became
Honorary Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society, Vice
President of the International Sociological Institute,
and Honorary Member of the International Statistical
Institute. In 1920 he was the founding Editor of the
journal Metron, which published papers by many em-
inent statisticians of the time, such as R. A. Fisher,
A. A. Chuprov, A. J. Lotka, S. S. Wilks, E. E. Slutsky,
S. Kullback, H. Wold and A. L. Bowley.
I: We have also heard of some funny stories about
Gini bearing ill-luck. Can you tell us something more?
E: Yes, this is somehow true, but it is to be consid-
ered within the typical Italian attitude of making fun of
powerful people, as Gini certainly was. There are vari-
ous minor anecdotes and a dramatic episode that would
allow to conjecture a “correlation” of the type you
are referring to. As for the latter, something incredible
happened in 1927: he was on the steamboat “Princess
Mafalda,” which shipwrecked off the Brazilian coast
between Salvador de Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, and he
was among the few survivors, the “legend” says thanks
to his rowing skills, a sport he had practiced in youth.
A less dramatic and funnier story I have heard of con-
cerns an episode where, chatting with a colleague of
his, he paid a compliment to a young female student’s
legs whom they met on the stairs: after a few steps she
fell down and broke her leg. I remember that Ottaviani
did not mention his name, he referred to him as the un-
named, since mentioning his name could have led to
something bad happening. All kidding aside, after the
shipwreck in Brazil, he criticized the Italian authori-
ties for the poor assistance from the Italian Navy and,
more in general, from the Italian government. These
complaints caused him a lot of troubles with the fascist
regime in Italy. He had, indeed, a strong and straight at-
titude that helped him to protect scientific matters and
appointments from political influence. Of course, this
position attracted the aversion of many Fascist party of-
ficials who strove for Mussolini to remove him as pres-
ident of the Italian Central Institute of Statistics. And
his criticisms on the occasion of the shipwreck were
added to the list of Gini’s “offences” to the regime that
led to his resignation in 1932. However, as I said be-
fore, he kept collaborating with the regime as a scien-
tific expert in demography, statistics and eugenics.
A: Cantelli, de Finetti and Gini were the towering
figures in probability and statistics before World War
II in Italy. They were also completely different charac-
ters. How did they get along?
E: Gini published de Finetti’s work on Mendelian
inheritance in Metron and offered de Finetti a job at
the Italian Central Office of Statistics before he grad-
uated. While at the Italian Central Office, de Finetti
was involved in a project for predicting the evolution of
the Italian population and crucially designed all mod-
eling aspects of the project. He then wanted this to be
credited as his contribution, but Gini was reluctant to
do so. This episode is well documented in one of the
letters de Finetti wrote to his mother and contained in
the collection published by his daughter that I have al-
ready mentioned. In any case, at the end of his four
year contract in 1931, de Finetti moved back to Trieste
and started to work for the insurance company Gen-
erali. The relationship between de Finetti and Cantelli
was quite a difficult one, since they were in strong dis-
agreement on the interpretation of probability. Cantelli
did not want to hear anything about finite additivity and
he also tried to prove that σ -additivity was a necessary
property.
I: In addition to Metron, there was also the Gior-
nale dell’Istituto Italiano degli Attuari (GIIA), which
was a top journal in statistics and probability during
the 1930s. Why have they both lost their international
reputation since then?
E: The GIIA was established in 1930, the same
year The Annals of Mathematical Statistics published
their first issue. It was edited by Cantelli and the most
distinguished scholars of the time, such as Cramér,
Fréchet, Kolmogorov, Khintchine, Lévy, Neyman and
von Mises, published fundamental contributions on it.
World War II ruined everything, since its publication
was suspended and the GIIA lost its elite status among
the top probability and statistics journals which, during
and soon after the war, included The Annals of Mathe-
matical Statistics, along with Biometrika and the Jour-
nal of the Royal Statistical Society. The other Italian
prestigious journal, Metron, which was established in
1920, paid a high price for the line of development of
Italian methodological statistics and actually already
declined before the war.
A: In 1978 you actually published a very interesting
paper characterizing the Dirichlet process in terms of
linear predictive distributions (Regazzini, 1978) on the
GIIA. Why did you decide this was a suitable outlet for
your paper?
660 A. LIJOI AND I. PRÜNSTER
E: After my discussions with Rukhin, the Dirich-
let process became a main ingredient of my research
agenda. In fact, I was dealing with risk premium mod-
els, for insurance companies, which were linear com-
binations of an empirical part and an expected value re-
lated to some prior guess—they identify the so-called
credibility premium. I thought to revisit the problem
coherently with the predictive distributions generated
by an exchangeable sequence and asked myself what
the underlying de Finetti measure was: it turned out to
be the law of a Dirichlet process. I wrote this paper
while I was working with Cifarelli on the distribution
of linear functionals of the Dirichlet process. I then pre-
sented it at a conference, where Luciano Daboni, an ed-
itorial board member of GIIA, was present: he liked the
paper a lot, invited me to give a seminar in Trieste and
proposed for me to publish it in GIIA. Some years later
the same result was independently obtained by Albert
Y. Lo (Lo, 1991).
I: During the 1980s you were probably one of the
few statisticians in Italy who published their papers in
international journals. Do you have any idea why this
happened at the time?
E: Well, first of all, most people, both in statistics
and probability, did not even try to submit their work
abroad. It was simply not necessary for the progress
in academic careers. Even many mathematicians only
published in Italian journals. Overall, the need for try-
ing to spread one’s own work at an international level
was not felt yet. Actually, it was probably not even
felt in the Anglo-American world: it just happened that
their journals then became the “international” ones. By
the way, papers that were published in Italian journals
with a very limited spreading were not all necessarily
of bad quality. On the contrary, some of them are very
well known even abroad and contain innovative ideas.
Anyhow, in recent years things have changed substan-
tially and young researchers submit their work to the
best international journals.
A: We, as students, have nice memories of summer
schools organized by the Italian scientific community
to support the spreading of probability and statistics.
You have been an active part of this initiatives.
E: After attending some of them as a student, I have
been involved several times in organizing and teaching
at summer schools that took place in various beauti-
ful locations in Italy, such as Cortona, Perugia, Livi-
gno and Rhême-Notre Dame. In addition to being an
opportunity to meet talented students, summer schools
also allowed me to get in contact, and actually build up
friendships, with some authoritative scholars such as
FIG. 1. Patrick Billingsley with Eugenio in Cortona, Summer
School, 1989.
Alan Agresti, Patrick Billingsley, Albert Y. Lo, Slava
Sazonov, Henry Teicher and Jon Wellner. Unfortu-
nately, the cuts operated through the years by the Ital-
ian governments have made it more difficult to sustain
the organization of such praiseworthy initiatives.
A: You then also started to collaborate with Sazonov.
In fact, one of your articles we really enjoyed read-
ing, for the wealth of results and techniques it offers, is
Regazzini and Sazonov (2000). How did you convince
him to do research on Bayesian statistics?
E: Slava was a wonderful person I really miss. He
was a loyal friend to me and an extraordinary mathe-
matician. I first met him at a conference at the begin-
ning of the 1990s and, then invited him to deliver a
course, jointly with Albert Lo, at a summer school or-
ganized by Bocconi University in 1992. He then taught
also in the 1993 and 1994 editions. We started collab-
orating in 1996, while he was teaching a course on
“Probability Theory in Hilbert spaces” at the Italian
National Research Council in Milano. Our first joint
work concerned central limit theorems for partially ex-
changeable arrays of random elements taking values
in a Hilbert space. At the time I was also preparing
my lectures for a Ph.D. course on Bayesian nonpara-
metrics to be taught in Roma and I was dealing with
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FIG. 2. Patrick Billingsley, standing in the far right, and Eugenio with some students in Cortona, Summer School, 1989.
the problem of estimating a statistical model by means
of a mixture of Dirichlet processes. Such a problem
was suggested by Diaconis and Ylvisaker (1985): with
Slava we showed that it is possible to construct a mix-
ture of laws of Dirichlet processes that approximates
the distribution of any random probability measure,
with respect to the topology of weak convergence. And
we have been able to obtain, under suitable assump-
tions, the corresponding approximation bounds for the
posterior measures. These results were presented at the
1st Workshop on Bayesian nonparametrics that took
place in Belgirate (Italy) in 1997. While we were work-
ing on this paper, my mother became seriously ill and
Slava has been very important in supporting me in such
a difficult period.
I: You have always had good relationships with
probabilists and statisticians from Russia. For exam-
ple, Ildar Ibragimov is another good friend of yours
who has been several times in Pavia contributing to the
Ph.D. program. I had the pleasure to attend his lectures
and really enjoyed them.
E: It was actually Slava who suggested I contact Il-
dar Ibragimov. In fact, I had asked Slava indications
for possible instructors for Ph.D. courses. And Slava
mentioned about Ildar and told me that in addition to
being a great scientist he was an excellent teacher. Of
course, I knew Ildar by fame and I feared he would
have not accepted my invitation but he did. I got the
chance to meet in person not only a brilliant mathe-
matician but also a wonderful person. His courses in
Pavia were greatly appreciated and I liked the fact that
he, and also Slava, was trying to adapt his lectures to
the students’ background. Our Ph.D. classes are quite
composite, with most students having either mathemat-
ics or economics degrees. The former typically have
good backgrounds in pure maths but not in statistics
and probability, whereas for the latter it is the opposite.
I remember Ildar asking me, “How come I have stu-
dents in my class who know about Radon–Nikodým
derivatives of stochastic processes but struggle with
Fourier transform coefficients?”
6. RESEARCH
6.1 Bayesian Nonparametrics
A: Your papers with Cifarelli on functionals of the
Dirichlet process (Cifarelli and Regazzini, 1979, 1990)
are probably your most well-known contributions to
Bayesian nonparametrics. And it is amazing how many
connections your results have with a variety of research
areas such as combinatorics, mathematical physics,
theory of stochastic processes, the moments problem,
and so on. Were you aware of these?
E: As I said, our original problem was merely of a
statistical nature. From an analytical point of view, the
task we were facing was very challenging, but we were
not aware of the connections with seemingly unrelated
areas of mathematics. We learned about some of these
relations thanks to the paper by Persi Diaconis and Jo-
hannes Kemperman that was presented at the Valencia
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FIG. 3. Workshop on “Recent developments in exchangeability,” Cortona, October 1991. Among others, Luigi Accardi, Donato M. Cifarelli,
Guido Consonni, Persi Diaconis, Joe Eaton, Colin Mallows, Jan von Plato, Maurizio Pratelli, Wolfgang Runggaldier, Marco Scarsini, Brian
Skyrms, Fabio Spizzichino, Piero Veronese, Wolfgang Woess and Eugenio.
meeting in 1994; see Diaconis and Kemperman (1996).
In addition to embedding the whole problem in a wider
mathematical context, it is also very well written and
sketches a few open problems; I strongly recommend
reading it. It is also thanks to this very same paper that
my work with Cifarelli gained some popularity.
I: The basic trick you resorted to was the inversion
of a Cauchy–Stieltjes transform for the mean of the
Dirichlet process. How did you arrive to this intuition?
FIG. 4. From the left: Alan Agresti, Eugenio and Slava Sazonov
in Livigno, Summer School, July 1993.
E: The procedure actually relied on the determina-
tion of recursive relations for the moments of the lin-
ear functional. Such a strategy was inspired by the
work of M. Kac who used it to obtain the well-known
Feynman–Kac formula; see, for example, Kac (1949).
This closeness is further revealed by the adoption, in
our paper, Cifarelli and Regazzini (1979), of the same
symbols used by Kac! Cifarelli had successfully used it
to establish a closed form expression for the probabil-
ity distribution of the integral of the absolute value of
the Brownian bridge in Cifarelli (1975). These recur-
sive relations we obtained allowed us to determine the
Laplace transform whose iteration yields the Cauchy–
Stieltjes transform. We then resorted to the inversion
formulae of the Cauchy–Stieltjes transform to deduce
an exact form for the probability distribution of a lin-
ear functional of the Dirichlet process. Most of these
ideas were already contained in Cifarelli and Regazz-
ini (1979). In Cifarelli and Regazzini (1990) we basi-
cally completed that paper and provided some further
insight.
A: More recently you developed an alternative
method based on an inversion formula for the char-
acteristic function.
E: The approach you are referring to was inspired by
the representation of the Dirichlet process as the nor-
malization of a gamma process that was first pointed
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FIG. 5. Slava Sazonov and Patrick Billingsley (on the left) and Eugenio and Andrew Rukhin (on the right) with some students in
Rhemes-Notre-Dame, Summer School, July 1994.
out by Ferguson himself in his 1973 paper. This repre-
sentation combined with a suitable inversion formula
led to new forms for the probability distribution of the
mean of a Dirichlet process, which are recorded in a
paper with Alessandra Guglielmi and Giulia Di Nunno.
I have then extended, with the two of you, the approach
to deal with means of random probability measures in-
duced by the normalization of a generic process with
independent increments.
I: At the moment, Bayesian nonparametric regres-
sion is a hot topic. In this respect, a paper of Ci-
farelli and yourself has been recently “rediscovered”
FIG. 6. From the left: Giorgio Dall’Aglio, Henry Teicher and Eu-
genio in Perugia, Summer School, August 1995.
(Cifarelli and Regazzini, 1978). Can you talk to us
about its origin and contents?
FIG. 7. Eugenio in Belgirate, 1st Bayesian Nonparametrics
Workshop, June 1997.
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FIG. 8. From the left: Donato M. Cifarelli, Persi Diaconis and
Eugenio at Stanford University, July 2002.
E: The original goal of our research was to deter-
mine a probability distribution for partially exchange-
able arrays of random elements. In particular, we were
looking for a solution that could be treated analytically,
while avoiding the independence assumption among
rows. These were the two reasons which led us to the
idea of resorting to the mixture of products of Dirichlet
processes. We have been able to determine the associ-
ated system of predictive laws and the distribution of
vectors of functionals. In a parametric setting, partial
exchangeability had been incorporated in a paper by
Lindley and Smith (Lindley and Smith, 1972). I then
used our model to study credibility formulae with col-
lateral data. Cifarelli had also developed the model for
applications to ANOVA and linear models, the latter in
collaboration with Marco Scarsini and Pietro Muliere.
We did not even submit the paper to a journal, since, as
I said, at the time a technical report or a journal pub-
lication counted the same for us. Nowadays, I am re-
ally pleased to see the recent explosion of proposals
on dependent nonparametric models, somehow in the
spirit of our 1978 paper, developed by S. MacEachern,
P. Müller, D. Dunson and many others.
I: In our opinion, the work of two probabilists,
John F. C. Kingman and Jim Pitman, has to be listed
among the main and most far reaching contributions to
Bayesian nonparametrics, even if not directly focused
on it. Do you share this view?
E: I am strongly in favor of a Bayesian approach that
solely relies on the specification of distributions for ob-
servable random elements. Therefore, in general, I like
all those contributions and tools that aim at provid-
ing systems of predictive distributions related to mod-
eling and applications. These do not resort to condi-
tional distributions, given parameters (either finite or
infinite-dimensional) that in some applications would
be devoid of any empirical meaning. And, the works by
Kingman and Pitman, although originated in different
FIG. 9. Jon Wellner and Eugenio with some students in Cortona, Summer School, August 2004.
A CONVERSATION WITH EUGENIO REGAZZINI 665
FIG. 10. Eugenio at a conference on “Non–linear PDEs: homogeneization and kinetic equations,” Wien, June 2006. In the picture, among
others: Peter Markowich, Pierre Degoud, Eric Carlen, Maria C. Carvalho, Ester Gabetta, Giuseppe Toscani, Cristian Ringhofer, Anton
Arnold and George Zubelli.
research areas, have an important impact on Bayesian
statistics. Even though I read their papers only recently,
I have appreciated them very much since they open up
the possibility of implementing the Bayesian paradigm
in the direction I lean toward.
6.2 Exchangeability
A: The contributions of Kingman and Pitman you
just mentioned are closely related to exchangeability,
a topic you extensively worked on both from a statisti-
cal and probabilistic point of view.
E: My interest in exchangeability was stimulated
by reading de Finetti’s papers. The first place where I
came across the statement of de Finetti’s representation
theorem was the monograph by Loève. But I could not
understand its statistical implications. I could appreci-
ate its relevance for inductive reasoning only through a
careful study of de Finetti (1930a, 1937a): in my opin-
ion, these papers really stand out in terms of concep-
tual and mathematical rigor and effectiveness in high-
lighting the role of exchangeability for induction, and
remain unbeaten to date. Of course, the modern uses
of exchangeability and the key role it plays in model-
ing a variety of phenomena are probably beyond what
de Finetti could have expected.
I: You have also been working on characterization
theorems in this context.
E: You are probably referring to results I have ob-
tained with Sandra Fortini and Lucia Ladelli and that
characterize systems of predictive distributions associ-
ated with exchangeable sequences of random elements.
I have also noted that these kinds of results have re-
cently attracted more and more interest in Bayesian
nonparametrics practice. Another interesting charac-
terization was obtained in a paper I coauthored with
Giovanni Petris where we dealt with exchangeability
in the presence of finitely additive probabilities: we
stated and proved a weak version of the representa-
tion theorem that reduces to the celebrated de Finetti
theorem (strong version) if one specializes to the case
of σ -additive probabilities. In this situation, we were
also able to use the representation theorem to show
existence of a random probability measure defined by
means of a system of finite-dimensional distributions
agreeing with Ferguson’s framework.
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FIG. 11. IMS President Jim Pitman with Eugenio at the IMS Fel-
lows Ceremony, 70th IMS Annual Meeting, Salt Lake City, July
2007.
I: You have also provided nice contributions to the
investigation of properties of partially exchangeability.
E: Indeed, I have been, and I still am, interested in
forms of dependence more general than exchangeabil-
ity, as witnessed by some contributions I have already
mentioned before, such as the paper on mixtures of
products of Dirichlet processes or the formulation of
a central limit theorem for partially exchangeable ar-
rays. Besides these, I wish to mention a nice character-
ization of partially exchangeable arrays that has been
established in a paper I wrote with Fortini, Ladelli and
Petris. Indeed, we proved a conjecture formulated in
de Finetti (1959), according to which a suitable ran-
dom matrix related to the transitions of a recurrent pro-
cess is partially exchangeable if and only if the law of
the process can be represented as a mixture of laws of
Markov chains. Moreover, we have been able to show
that de Finetti’s definition of partial exchangeability is
equivalent to the one provided by Diaconis and Freed-
man in a couple of papers they wrote in 1980.
6.3 Subjective Probability
I: In some of your work you have also provided some
insight into an approach to Bayesian statistical infer-
ence based on finitely additive conditional probabili-
ties.
E: I started getting involved into research on finitely
additive conditional probabilities after reading some
papers by R. Scozzafava in the first half of the 1980s.
In fact, I grew convinced that countable additivity was
not justifiable—as a necessary condition—unlike fi-
nite additivity which is necessary for the validity of
de Finetti’s coherence principle. Therefore, finitely ad-
ditive probabilities have to be considered as admissi-
ble and I became interested in revisiting known results
in probability as particular cases of the finitely addi-
tive framework. In particular, I found the interpretation
of the definition of conditional probability, as given by
Kolmogorov, unsatisfactory. Conditioning is based on
classes of events that partition the whole sample space
and that become finer and finer: conditional probabil-
ity is then obtained through a limiting process in terms
of a Radon–Nikodým derivative, and depends on the
class of events one conditions on. In de Finetti’s ap-
proach, a conditional probability, given an event, is
defined through a natural, and unavoidable, strength-
ening of the coherence principle. De Finetti himself
had hinted at such a possibility, without developing
his idea in general mathematical terms. I tried to make
this more explicit in some papers I wrote during the
1980s in Regazzini (1985, 1987). These topics have
been object of further investigation by my friends P.
Berti and P. Rigo. An important point is that many
situations that appear as paradoxical if one refers to
Kolmogorov’s conditional probabilities can be justified
within the finitely additive framework.
A: Can you provide us with an example?
E: The most well-known is probably Borel’s para-
dox. Indeed, if a uniform distribution on the surface of
a sphere is defined, with respect to a specific choice
of geographic coordinates (namely, latitude and lon-
gitude), one would expect that the conditional distri-
bution for latitude, given a fixed longitude, is uni-
form. However, this does not happen in Kolmogorov’s
framework. In de Finetti’s approach, instead, one can
adopt the more intuitive probability assessment even
if it would be nondisintegrable. The reason for such a
behavior can be traced back to the specific notion of
conditional probability according to Kolmogorov’s ap-
proach, since it does not admit the evaluation of the
probability of an “isolated event” with probability zero.
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On the contrary, de Finetti’s setup is open to different
solutions: indeed, disintegrability turns out to be not
necessary for coherence.
I: Another amusing aspect of finitely additive condi-
tional probabilities emerges from your work on well-
calibration of systems of predictive distributions.
E: Loosely speaking, well-calibration corresponds
to situations where the distance between weighted av-
erages of forecast probabilites and empirical obser-
vations converges to zero as the number of observa-
tions, and forecasts, increases. Kolmogorov’s theory
always yields well-calibrated predictions or forecasts.
This corresponds to a somehow unrealistic situation
in practice, since one would also expect cases of not
well-calibration. With P. Berti and P. Rigo we were in-
terested in checking whether the same was true within
de Finetti’s theory as well. Our curiosity to this prob-
lem was stimulated by a paper of Phil Dawid (Dawid,
1982). The answer we got was naturally affirmative for
strategic conditional probabilities. The term strategic
was coined by Dubins and Savage in their well-known
monograph where they resorted to de Finetti’s the-
ory to solve quite complicated measurability problems.
Strategic conditional probabilities do indeed preserve,
in a finitely additive setting, the disintegrability prop-
erty that characterizes Kolmogorov’s definition. As for
well-calibration, we were able to show that, beyond
strategic evaluations, there exist not well-calibrated co-
herent Bayesian predictors with positive probability.
A: Many critics of de Finetti’s subjectivistic stand-
point in probability theory use, as an argument for sup-
porting their position, de Finetti’s sentence “probabil-
ity does not exist.” What can be replied to such objec-
tions?
E: First of all, one should consider the provoca-
tive nature of de Finetti’s sentence. Moreover, its
meaning should not be decontextualized. According
to de Finetti, if one wants to give probability an objec-
tive meaning, one should prove its existence. In other
words, there should be an existence theorem, a clear
proof of the existence of an object termed “probabil-
ity.” For example, the interpretation of probability as
a limiting frequency cannot be considered as a proof,
even if just empirical, of its existence. Hence, he used
the expression “probability does not exist” just to make
the point that probability has simply a subjective mean-
ing. It is also to be said that most of the criticism raised
against subjectivism basically refers to the contents of
his two-volume monograph, de Finetti (1970), which
is, according to its subtitle, “a critical introductory
treatment.” In my opinion, de Finetti’s position can be
better discussed by relying on his early works, which
are more concise, go straight to the point and display
more mathematical and formal details.
I: A noteworthy scholar who contributed to the the-
ory of finitely additive probabilities was Lester Dubins.
You were also a good friend of his and had the chance
to host him in Milano.
E: Dubins had been in Italy several times and he de-
livered courses at summer schools. He was very fond
of Italy and, in the second half of the 1980s, I invited
him once to stay for a month in Milano. We had dis-
cussions on various research topics. He was the source
of many ideas that I later developed in my research. In
those years I was mainly working on technical aspects
of nonparametric inference, whereas he could provide
me with many insights into theoretical issues related
to finite additivity that turned out to be of great impor-
tance to me.
6.4 Probabilistic Methods for Mathematical
Physics
A and I: You have lately become interested in some
problems in mathematical physics. How did it happen?
E: Moving to Pavia in 1998, I joined a Mathemat-
ics Department with a few internationally well-known
mathematical physics scholars. I started interacting
with them and at some point a colleague of mine, Es-
ter Gabetta, showed me some papers where the Cen-
tral Limit Theorem was used to describe the conver-
gence to equilibrium of the solution of certain kinetic
equations. In particular, I read two papers, McKean
(1966, 1967), that spurred my enthusiasm for the topic.
I tried to understand and extend the connections with
probability, and could count on the collaboration of my
colleagues to help me understand the problem from the
perspective of physics. Furthermore, the encourage-
ment from Eric Carlen and Maria Carvalho has been
important for pursuing my research in this direction. In
fact, they liked our first results and suggested us to pub-
lish them (see Gabetta and Regazzini, 2006): there we
obtained some identities that came in handy for later
developments of the work in this area.
A and I: Was this line of research as rewarding as
others you have pursued in your career?
E: I would say I am happy about what I have
achieved so far with my coauthors. Starting from the
Kac model, which is generally considered as a toy
model, we obtained some interesting results concern-
ing the characterization of the initial data in order to
gain convergence to equilibrium. We have also con-
sidered situations where the energy, interpreted as
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the variance of the initial datum, is infinite and we
performed an analysis of the speed of convergence.
In these studies, I have also collaborated with Lu-
cia Ladelli and Federico Bassetti. Later, I have super-
vised the thesis of Emanuele Dolera, a Ph.D. student in
Pavia. This work has required a strong effort that was
rewarded by the achievement of a noteworthy result
proving the validity of a conjecture formulated in the
1966 McKean paper. In the last 40 years many scholars
have worked hard with the aim of proving it.
7. THOUGHTS ON FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES AND
RESEARCH IN STATISTICS
I: In some of the previous questions we have lin-
gered on the subjectivistic interpretation of probability.
What is the most relevant impact this has on statistics?
E: A crucial point to understand is whether it is
worth preserving an axiomatization based on count-
able additivity. Of course, I think it does not gener-
ally have a statistical justification that makes its use
necessary. If finitely additive probabilities are also ad-
missible, then a considerable number of results in the
literature should be revisited. I have already mentioned
that one should reconsider the definition of conditional
expectation. Moreover, a number of limiting theorems
should be reformulated in order to account for this
more general framework. These issues are also of great
relevance in statistics regardless of the approach, either
frequentist or Bayesian, one adopts.
A: Does this lead, among others, to a rethinking of
Bayesian procedures?
E: Indeed, Bayesian procedures are typically imple-
mented by assuming complete additivity and this leads
to assume some of its implications as necessary. Let us
consider, as an example, the Dirichlet process. A well-
known result is that the Dirichlet process selects, al-
most surely, discrete probability measures. However,
such a property holds true for the countably additive
extension of the collections of finite-dimensional prob-
ability distributions of the process. There are other non
σ -additive extensions for which the Dirichlet process
selects nondiscrete distributions with positive proba-
bility. This points to the fact that in statistical prac-
tice one should avoid assessing a probability for ob-
jects devoid of empirical evidence. For example, take
the proposition stating that de Finetti’s measure is the
law of the (almost sure) weak limit of the empirical
distribution: thus, it depends on infinitely many obser-
vations and concerns “transcendent”—in de Finetti’s
words—conditions not directly verifiable. The conclu-
sion of such a proposition could be obviously false with
non σ -additive extensions. On the other hand, the fact
that de Finetti’s measure is the weak limit of the low of
the empirical distribution, as the sample size increases,
is, in any case, true: in my opinion this suffices with
respect to sound statistical goals. I think this is an im-
portant foundational aspect, which is often neglected
and should be further investigated.
I: Are you saying that one should have clear in mind
the different levels at which mathematics and statistical
applications operate?
E: More or less, that is what I mean. Indeed, it is
true that mathematics makes parameters interpretable
as limits of (or of functionals of) empirical processes,
but it does not automatically grant that inference on
them are legitimate.
A: Does this position contrast with the usual way of
presenting a Bayesian model as the combination of a
likelihood and a prior?
E: Let me start by making an important point that
reflects my view on statistics: if inference is seen as a
decision problem to be solved under uncertainty and
if one agrees that probability is a tool to resort to,
then there is no other choice but the Bayesian ap-
proach. Nonetheless, I agree with what Diaconis and
Ylvisaker say at the beginning of their paper Diaconis
and Ylvisaker (1985): Bayesian statistics cannot be re-
duced to the elicitation of a prior and the automatic
application of Bayes’ theorem. Hence, I would give
an affirmative answer to your question if one condi-
tions on unobservable quantities. But this is not limit-
ing the scope of Bayesian inference at all. Indeed, one
can think of inferential procedures that can still be im-
plemented in this more general framework, even when
unobservable parameters are involved. The previously
mentioned “weak” interpretation of the de Finetti mea-
sure says that a prior distribution can be viewed, in any
case and with no distinction between observable and
not observable parameters, as an approximation of the
law of a frequency distribution or of some functional
of it. Moreover, prediction can be carried out without
relying on the Bayes–Laplace paradigm: it is enough
to specify the system of predictive distributions con-
nected to the exchangeable sequence. And I have ap-
preciated very much the work by J. Pitman which, in
the spirit of de Finetti’s stance, relies on the proposal of
systems of predictive distributions that are then proved
to be associated to an exchangeable sequence.
A: I also guess that a subjectivist would not agree on
the notion of posterior consistency as a frequentist val-
idation criterion of Bayesian nonparametric methods.
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E: I have to admit that, besides the Bayesian context,
I am skeptical on the use of consistency in a frequen-
tist setting as well. On the one hand, these limiting re-
sults are very neat and beautiful from a mathematical
point of view. But, on the other, they lack a sensible
statistical interpretation. This is very well discussed in
de Finetti (1970), Volume 2, in the section devoted to
the laws of large numbers where he motivates why re-
sults, such as consistency, do not represent justifica-
tions of statistical procedures under the assumption of
stochastic independence. The same can be said for the
Glivenko–Cantelli theorem. Of course, my position en-
compasses commonly used frequentist validation crite-
ria adopted in a Bayesian framework. A different role
must be attributed to approximation results, like Cen-
tral Limit Theorems or, also, the “weak” interpretation
of the de Finetti measure, for which these concerns do
not apply.
I: So, what are the kind of asymptotic problems that
you think are interesting for Bayesians?
E: The kind of results I like are those in the spirit
of Blackwell and Dubins (1962) where they investi-
gate the phenomenon of the merging of opinions. This
is a very nice finding both from a mathematical and
from a statistical point of view. On the one hand, it is
a general result valid even beyond exchangeability. On
the other hand, it has a nice statistical interpretation for
Bayesians since it hints at the predominance of empir-
ical findings over different subjective prior opinions as
the sample size or, in other terms, the amount of in-
formation, increases. Other results of great interest are
those that currently are designated as Bernstein–von
Mises type theorems for the posterior distribution. It
is worth noticing that among the first contributions to
this topic there is also an important paper, Romanovsky
(1931), published on GIIA.
A: From what you said up to now on the interplay
between Bayesian inference and de Finetti’s interpre-
tation of probability, a valuable research topic would
focus on the analysis of the asymptotic behavior of the
predictive distributions.
E: You are right. In my opinion, an important issue to
address is the analysis of the distance between the pre-
dictive and the empirical distributions. Instead of look-
ing at the limiting behavior, it would be more interest-
ing to analyze how such a discrepancy changes for any
sample size n and, a fortiori, as n increases. Since the
predictive can also be obtained as a functional of the
posterior distribution, one can also gain some insight
if one relies on convergence theorems, which say that
the posterior converges, in some sense, to a distribu-
tion concentrated on the limit of the empirical process.
In this respect, Bernstein–von Mises type results are
useful.
I: You have had a large number of students, and by
now also descendants, working in many different uni-
versities in Italy and abroad. In your opinion, what is
the background a statistics student needs to perform
well in nowadays research and what are the topics you
would suggest to pursue?
E: As I said earlier, I see statistics as inductive
reasoning under the supervision of probability theory.
Therefore, it is natural that I firmly believe that statis-
ticians should have a solid background in probability:
the more the better. However, a statistician must also
be able to think through the logical and philosophical
aspects of what she/he is doing. This concerns model-
ing, the understanding of practical implications yielded
by the mathematical formulation that is used, and the
interpretation of results. Mathematical skills are not
enough, logical and conceptual rigor being a necessary
complement. One needs to be able to handle statistics
since it is a powerful instrument, which allows one to
make substantial steps forward, compared to traditional
deterministic procedures. Statistics can get you close
to the best solutions, avoiding overwhelming techni-
cal and mathematical difficulties that often arise within
deductive deterministic reasoning. The latter approach
lacks the flexibility of a learning mechanism, whereas
in the probabilistic framework everything is kept under
control: you have a law which governs everything and,
unless you change the learning mechanism, it allows
one to learn from experience in a way that is transpar-
ent and controlled by Bayes’ theorem.
A: In modern science the specialization of re-
searchers is constantly increasing. Even probability
and statistics, which have grown in close relationship
to each other, seem to be drifting apart.
E: You can observe the fragmentation of fields all
over the place. This phenomenon also originates from
an excessive specialization that characterizes most un-
dergraduate studies. The situation was, in the past,
quite different and there were many scholars with a
wide spectrum knowledge and diversified cultural and
scientific interests. De Finetti and Gini are excellent ex-
amples in this respect. That said, fragmentation in re-
search is unavoidable and it would be unrealistic to try
reversing it. It is just a pity to see that it tends to cre-
ate duplications and repetitions, whereas a more cohe-
sive scientific community could produce better results
in a collective effort. In statistics, Bayesian statisticians
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have kept to themselves for some time in reaction to the
then mainstream statistics, which was certainly not in
favor of Bayesian methods. Now with Bayes statistics
well-established, I note that younger generations are
more open to interactions with non-Bayesian, which
in my opinion is certainly beneficial. A different is-
sue is the specialization in education, which should be
contrasted to some extent because it precludes possible
paths to future researchers. As I have already said, ev-
ery statistician should have a solid background in prob-
ability and every probabilist should know the basics of
statistics, which is a noble and fascinating, at least to
me, field of application of probability.
I: How should, in your opinion, a good statistics pa-
per be structured?
E: Well, first of all the definition “good” is to be con-
sidered with reference to the historical period. Until
some years ago theoretical papers were very appreci-
ated, whereas nowadays applied work plays an increas-
ing role thanks to the computational tools. However,
I think that, in general, different forms of motivation
are equally valid: an enrichment of the available tools,
an improvement over other existing contributions or a
useful application are all fine. However, in all cases
it is crucial that the paper is logically sound and co-
herent with its motivation. This is essential since we
write for the scientific community and not for the gen-
eral public, which is another job. For instance, I do
not like methodological papers, to which an illustra-
tion has been evidently added only for editorial needs.
A methodological contribution can stand on its own if
its motivation is sound. While I was young I experi-
enced some of the last manifestations of Gini’s school,
which as a rule of thumb required publications to in-
clude data, a table and a plot. To me this does not make
sense. I also do not like applied papers in which one
sets forth a model, analyzes a couple of data sets and
concludes that the model works well. Any so-called
empirical validation does not show anything and is not
enough to assess the suitability of a model. Indeed,
there should also be a sensible methodological moti-
vation in the sense that one should explain which fea-
tures of a certain model make it more appropriate for
the problem at hand.
A and I: Moving away from statistics and probabil-
ity, we already mentioned your passion for music. How
did you get fond of music and what else are you inter-
ested in when you do not do research?
E: Being born in Cremona, my passion for music
is quite natural: it is 20 km away from the places
Giuseppe Verdi grew up in, melodrama is popular and
there is a great tradition. It is also the hometown of
Claudio Monteverdi and of Amilcare Ponchielli, two
famous composers. Last but not least, it is the town of
lute makers, the most renowned being Antonio Stradi-
vari. Even the general public knows opera very well.
Then, starting from opera when I was young, my in-
terest extended to symphonic music. I have also been
fond of visual arts since I was a kid: I loved paint-
ings, architecture and sculpture since I related them to
Italian history. I remember having a great teacher at
school who used to emphasize links between history,
arts and literature. A peculiar feature of Italy is that, if
you are interested in any historical aspect, you neces-
sarily end up considering also painting, sculpture and
architecture since they are all intimately connected. We
obviously benefited from Christian culture that played
a fundamental role, after the fall of the Roman Em-
pire, in preserving the wonders inherited from classi-
cal Greek and Roman traditions and in promoting arts
in forms we can today admire while visiting churches,
historical buildings, squares and museums. Moreover,
during the Renaissance, there were a large number of
small states and many of them had patrons who liked
and could afford being surrounded by artists. Hence,
many towns developed their peculiar artistic heritage.
A and I: Eugenio, thanks a lot for patiently answer-
ing all our questions.
E: Thanks to you for listening to all this!
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